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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that the European Union should not, as it 
currently proposes, extend the term of protection for sound 
recordings in Europe.  It compares the U.K. government’s current 
policy that the scope and length of copyright protection for sound 
recordings should not be extended, with that of the European 
Union which, encouraged by the French government particularly, 
has recently proposed an extension from the fifty-year term to a 
ninety-five-year term of copyright protection for sound recordings. 
It analyzes several major independent reviews of the evidence on 
extending copyright protection for sound recordings, including the 
findings and recommendations of the December 2006 Gowers 
Review of Intellectual Property, an independent study 
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commissioned by the U.K government, the University of 
Amsterdam Institute for Information Law report for the European 
Commission on the harmonization of copyright and related rights 
protections in Europe, and subsequent government consultation 
and strategy documents on proposed changes to U.K. law. It also 
reviews the positions taken by other stakeholders, including the 
music industry, academics and the media, in this debate, and 
analyzes the likely direction of the law in Europe. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ian Anderson of Jethro Tull is apparently “horrified that, along 
with countless other great artists and bands of the 60’s and 70’s, 
Jethro Tull’s earliest recordings will progressively fall out of 
copyright in the foreseeable future under current U.K. 
legislation.”1  French President Nicholas Sarkozy is reportedly 
similarly concerned about royalties on behalf of all Europe’s aging 
rock stars, and wants the European Union to extend the fifty-year 
period for which copyright in sound recordings and performers’ 
rights are protected in Europe.2 
In arguing to increase the term of copyright protection, Ian 
Anderson has historical precedent on his side; successive copyright 
acts have steadily expanded the subject matter covered by 
copyright and related rights, and increased the term of protection, 
from a fourteen year renewable term in the first British copyright 
act of 1709,3 up to 120 years for some works made for hire under 
U.S. law today.4  However, in 2007 the British Government 
 
 A PDF version of this Article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=3025.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, The College of New Jersey. 
1 Ian Anderson, Anderson Speaks Out on Recorded Copyright Law in the U.K., 
JETHRO TULL: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.j-tull.com/news/ 
UKcopyrightlaw.cfm. 
 2 Charles Bremner, Nicholas Sarkozy’s Gold Retirement for Rock Dinosaurs, TIMES 
ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2008, http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/ 
music/article3285729.ece. 
 3 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 4 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006). 
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rejected the idea of a further extension of protection for sound 
recordings and performers’ rights,5 after a review of the British 
Intellectual Property system by former Financial Times editor 
Andrew Gowers,6 found that the copyright system was already 
stacked strongly in favor of copyright holders,7 and recommended 
against any extension, and also recommended that U.K. law in the 
future adopt the principle of not retrospectively extending IP 
rights.8 
This paper compares the U.K. government’s current policy that 
the scope and length of copyright protection for sound recordings 
should not be extended, with that of the European Union which, 
encouraged by the French government particularly,9 has recently 
proposed a 95-year term of copyright protection for sound 
recordings.10  It focuses on the findings and recommendations 
made by the December 2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property commissioned by the U.K. government,11 the University 
of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law report for the E.U. on 
copyright and related rights12 (“IViR Report”), and the subsequent 
 
 5 HM TREASURY PRE-BUDGET REPORT, INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S POTENTIAL: BUILDING 
OUR LONG-TERM FUTURE, 2006, Cm. 6984, at 65, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm69/6984/6984.asp [hereinafter PRE-BUDGET REPORT]. 
 6 A short profile of Andrew Gowers is available at HM Treasury’s website. Andrew 
Gowers, Biography, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/gowersreview_biography.htm (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 7 ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 50 (2006), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf (“Economic 
evidence indicates that the length of protection for copyright works already far exceeds 
the incentives required to invest in new works.”). 
 8 Id. at 6. 
 9 See Bremner, supra note 2. 
 10 Press Release, European Commission, “Performing Artists—No Longer Be the 
‘Poor Cousins’ of the Music Business”—Charlie McCreevy (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/240 [hereinafter 
Performing Artists]. 
 11 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1. 
 12 BERNT HUGENHOLZ ET AL., THE RECASTING OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS FOR 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
copyright/docs/studies/etd2005imd195recast_report_2006.pdf [hereinafter IVIR REPORT]. 
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U.K. government consultation and strategy document on U.K. 
proposed changes to copyright protections.13 
The paper details the opposing views on extending the duration 
of protection of stakeholders within Europe, and analyzes the 
likely direction of the law in Europe, and the effect of the E.U. 
approach on the duration of copyright protection, to the ongoing 
global debate on the ideal balance and optimum duration for 
copyright and related rights in a digital age.  The paper uses the 
term “related rights” commonly used in E.U. law for rights akin to 
copyright, such as recording or performers’ rights, rather than the 
term “neighboring rights,” more often employed under U.K. law 
for such rights. 
Part I of the paper consists of a discussion of the purpose and 
policy behind copyright protection and the development of 
copyright laws in the common law and civil law traditions, 
including details of copyright and related rights protections in the 
United Kingdom and United States and the effect of current E.U. 
directives on U.K. law.  Part II sets out the major challenge to the 
copyright system created by the revolution in digital technology 
and reviews the positions taken so far by the opposing sides in the 
debate over how copyright law should react to digitization and 
globalization.  Part III concentrates on the empirical findings and 
recommendations of the Gowers Review, and other U.K. 
government actions, in response to the question of how to adapt 
U.K. copyright laws to a global and technological world, while 
Part IV assesses the IViR Report and proposals at the European 
level on the same issue.  Finally, Part V considers the likely 
direction of E.U. law and develops the argument that there are no 
good reasons to increase the term of protection for related rights 
and the E.U. should seriously reconsider its proposal to do so and 
should not listen exclusively to the music industry in this debate. 
 
 13 U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, TAKING FORWARD THE GOWERS REVIEW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSED CHANGES TO COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS (Jan. 2008), 
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-copyrightexceptions.pdf. 
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I. PURPOSE AND POLICY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
The Gowers Review stated that Intellectual Property law serves 
three principal functions: “to incentivise knowledge (and hence 
wealth) creation; to accumulate knowledge in a culture; and to 
protect a distinctive identity.”14  According to Gowers, the 
purposes of copyright protection are both to provide incentives to 
create knowledge, while also enabling knowledge to become 
publicly available.  “[W]ithout protection there would be no 
economic incentive to fund innovation or creativity.”15  Gowers 
recognized that copyright involves a balance between making 
knowledge publicly available to all, and providing economic 
incentives to those who create it, and that the main rationale for 
copyright protection, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, is 
the economic, utilitarian rationale.16  However, in the Review’s 
mention of protecting a “distinctive identity,” Gowers also seemed 
to acknowledge another rationale of copyright law, that of 
protecting the property rights of the creator, a theory more often 
linked to civil law systems.17 
A. Utilitarian Theory 
The dominant theory of copyright protection in the Anglo-
American tradition is utilitarianism, where the economic incentives 
provided to authors by the monopoly-type protection of copyright 
law must be balanced by the requirement that the protected 
expression is not given absolute, nor indefinite, protection from all 
non-permitted use.18  Most importantly, protected work should 
eventually fall into the public domain, so that it can become 
accessible for the benefit of future innovators and creators.19  “The 
principle justification for intellectual property (IP) laws in the 
 
 14 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 11. 
 15 Id. at 12. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See, e.g., LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT 37 n.55 (2007) (“It 
is often claimed that . . . continental copyright law w[as] inspired by . . . authors’ natural 
rights.”); Jane Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991 (1990) (“French copyright law is said to 
enshrine the author.”); GOWERS, supra note 7, at 15. 
 18 See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 9–13. 
 19 See id at 12. 
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Anglo-American tradition is economic.”20 Although a variety of 
commentators have at various times favored perpetual copyright 
protection,21 a perpetual property right for authors does not fit 
comfortably within this utilitarian, economic bargain that balances 
the rights of the public and authors. 
B. Personhood and Other Alternative Theories 
There are several theories other than utilitarianism that have 
been used to explain intellectual property protection.  According to 
Lior Zemer, “[s]ix major approaches dominate the literature . . . the 
instrumental/utilitarian approach; the labour theory of property; the 
personhood theory; social-institutional-planning; traditional 
proprietarianism; and authorial constructionism.”22  The main 
characteristics of the non-utilitarian theories of copyright 
protection is that they are focused more on the allocation of 
property rights to the author (whether in the fruits of his labor, or 
the creations of his personality or authorship) than in providing a 
balance between encouraging the author to create, and promoting 
public knowledge.23 
Copyright protection in France and other countries of 
Continental Europe evolved from the theory of personality rights.24  
The rationale for copyright protection under this theory is that “the 
allocation of entitlements and control over resources in the external 
environment, in the guise of property, is necessary for the 
development of personality.”25  As a result, since its inception, 
French copyright law has used the life of the author as a starting 
point for calculating the duration of the copyright term, and, in 
addition to economic rights, provided protection for the author’s 
 
 20 Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?, 1 
U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 3, 3 (2004). 
 21 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHT AND COPYWRONGS 71 (2001); see also Mark 
Helprin, Op-Ed., A Great Idea Lives Forever. Shouldn’t Its Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, May 
20, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/opinion/20helprin.html. 
 22 See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 9. 
 23 See id. at 13–21. 
 24 Id. at 16; see also Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 996. 
 25 See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 16. 
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inalienable, natural rights, so-called “moral rights.”26  Moral rights 
derive from the conception that the work is part of the author’s 
personality,27 but have not received statutory protection in the U.K. 
tradition until fairly recently.28 
It is theoretically easier, under these author-centered 
conceptions of the purpose of copyright, to justify perpetual 
copyright protection because authors’ rights are paramount,29 
while, on the other hand, also limiting the duration of protection 
afforded to performers, on the basis that they are not creators on a 
par with authors, but merely reproducers of already created work, 
and thus deserve a more limited duration of protection.30  The 
influence of the European “personhood” or “labor-based 
justification” can be seen in the Berne Convention; its inclusion of 
moral rights,31 the calculation of the term of copyright based on the 
lifetime of the author of the work,32 and the fact that it does not 
protect the related rights of reproducers such as sound recordings 
and performers’ rights which did not received international 
recognition and protection until much later.33 
 
 26 Moral rights are defined as “the right to claim authorship of the work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”  Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 
revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept. 29, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
 27 See ZEMER, supra note 17, at 51. 
 28 Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 77–89 (Eng.). 
 29 See, e.g., VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 71–72 (discussing Samuel Clemens’ 
preference for perpetual copyright for authors based on moral rather than economic 
rationales). Although Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), among others, favored perpetual 
copyright, it does not fit philosophically with the “limited times” economic rationale of 
Anglo-American law.  
 30 See Ruth Towse, The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers’ Rights from 
the Perspective of a Cultural Economist, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 745, 748 (2007), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss3/art6 (“Composers, however, were always 
vulnerable to unauthorized copying of their works whereas performers were not until 
relatively recently.”).  Thus, performers did not need as much protection. 
 31 Berne Convention, supra note 26. 
 32 Id. art. 7. 
 33 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome 
Convention] was the first international recognition for rights in sound recordings.  The 
United States is not a party to this convention. 
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C. Harmonization of Copyright Law 
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, copyright and 
related rights laws have been partially harmonized by a large 
number of international treaties starting with the Berne 
Convention, and followed later by the Rome Convention, the 
Universal Copyright Convention, Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty.34  It 
matters little now whether a signatory countries’ law was based 
originally on the Anglo-American tradition of the economic 
utilitarian bargain, or the Continental labor-based property 
ownership theory.  It must now provide minimum protection based 
on these international treaties for various copyright and related 
rights.35  Copyright must be protected for the life of the author plus 
fifty years under Berne,36 and sound recordings and performers’ 
rights are required to be protected for a lesser period, ranging from 
a minimum of twenty years, in the case of the Rome Convention,37 
to fifty years under the WIPO Treaty and TRIPs Agreement.38  
This reflects the continued conception of performers’ and 
phonographic rights as economic rights rather than personality-
based rights. 
No international treaty requires these related rights to be 
protected for anything approaching the term of ninety-five years 
(or life plus seventy years) for which they are now protected under 
 
 34 See supra notes 32 and 33 for the Berne and Rome Conventions respectively.  Other 
intellectual property conventions include the Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 [hereinafter Universal Copyright Convention]; 
Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994; 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]; and World Intellectual 
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 
76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Treaty]. 
 35 Ginsburg argues in A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, supra note 17, at 994, that the differences between the U.S. and 
French copyright systems were, even at their inception, not as extensive as typically 
described. 
 36 See Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 7. 
 37 See Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 14. 
 38 See TRIPs Agreement art. 12 and WIPO Treaty art. 17, supra note 34. 
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U.S. law39 or for which it is currently proposed to protect them in 
Europe.40  The current main difference in the duration of copyright 
and related rights worldwide is this difference in the protection of 
related rights in Europe and in the U.S. 
D. Copyright Protection Under U.K. Law 
1. Statute of Anne 
Modern copyright protection in the Anglo-American tradition 
is generally traced back to the Statute of Anne which provided a 
copyright term of fourteen years for books and maps.41  In fact, the 
Statute of Anne followed from the abolition of the printing 
monopoly provided by over 150 years of various Licensing Acts to 
the Stationers’ Company, the guild of London printers.42 
After the stationers lost their monopoly on book publication, 
and censorship in 1695, chaos reigned in the newly deregulated 
publishing industry which the printers, used to their monopoly, 
were not equipped to meet, and they realized that they had to 
include authors in their struggle to impose some order and get back 
some legal control over the industry.43  The resulting compromise 
was the Statute of Anne, “an elaborate attempt to regulate 
publishers, a way to balance the interests of the bookprinting 
industry with the concerns that monopolies were growing too 
powerful in England.”44 
Under the Statute of Anne, copyright protection was initially 
awarded to the author, who could register to receive a term of 
protection for fourteen years, renewable for another fourteen 
years,45 but it was always recognized that “[a] manuscript is worth 
 
 39 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006). 
 40 See Performing Artists, supra note 10. 
 41 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 42 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 39–40. 
 43 See id. for details of the stationers’ efforts to regain legal control of the book 
publishing industry. 
 44 Id. at 40.  See id. at 39 for a description of some of the first copyright lobbying: 
“[The Stationers] came up to Parliament in the form of petitioners, with tears in their 
eyes, hopeless and forlorn; they brought with them their wives and children to excite 
compassion, and induce Parliament to grant them statutory security.” 
 45 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
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nothing on the market until an author assigns the rights to a 
publisher . . . the real player in the legal and commercial game.”46  
In the same manner, in the music industry, middle men and 
distributors like recording companies see themselves as the “real 
players,” vital to the success of musicians. 
2. Early Development of U.K. Copyright Law 
English copyright law developed rapidly and by 1801, it had 
clearly abandoned the requirement of registration to gain 
protection.47  By 1814 the law had also abandoned the specific 
years as a basis for the term of protection, settling instead on a 
period of protection based on the lifetime of the author.48  Rights 
have been added under U.K. legislation as the types of intellectual 
creation have increased and new methods of distribution have been 
created.49  A public performance right for dramatic works was first 
added by the Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833,50 and 
subsequently extended to cover musical works in the Copyright 
Act of 1842.51  Sound recordings gained protection in 1911.52 
Films and broadcasts were added in their own right, relatively late, 
in 1956.53 
3. Current U.K. Copyright Law 
Both copyrights and related rights are currently protected in the 
U.K. primarily under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(“CDPA”),54 as amended.  The CDPA “confers rights on the 
authors (and their assignees) of a number of different types of 
intellectual creation which are listed exhaustively in section 1 of 
 
 46 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 40. 
 47 Copyright Act, 1801, 41 Geo. 3, c. 107 (Eng.). 
 48 William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle 
Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 916 (1997). 
 49 Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse 
Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005). 
 50 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15, § 1 (Eng.). 
 51 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 20 (Eng.). 
 52 Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 19 (Eng.). 
 53 Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §§ 13, 14 (Eng.). 
 54 Copyrights Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 (Eng.). 
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the 1988 Act.”55  The Act introduced a number of new rights, such 
as rental rights in respect of sound recordings, films and computer 
programs,56 and, for the first time in U.K. law, a comprehensive 
system of rights for performers and moral rights for authors.57 
For a song, a number of rights may arise simultaneously—
musical copyright in the sounds, literary copyright in the words 
and a sound recording right in the recording itself.58  Performers’ 
rights may also arise in relation to the performance of the work.59  
All of these rights may have the same or different owners.  The 
rights in the music and words will often be owned initially by the 
composer and lyricist, but will then be assigned to a publishing 
company.60  Copyright in the sound recording will generally 
initially vest in the producer, a recording company.61  Certain of 
the performers’ rights can also be assigned to another person 
(generally the recording company again) under an “exclusive 
recording contract.”62  Copyright in the sound recording and the 
performers’ rights both have a shorter duration (fifty years)63 than 
the copyright in the words and music of a song (life of author plus 
seventy years).64 
E. Effect of European Copyright Directives 
Although U.K. legislation is written in Westminster, it is in 
reality constrained by both E.U. law, which seeks to achieve the 
harmonization of copyright protection within the countries of the 
 
 55 CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, REVIEW OF THE 
ECONOMIC EVIDENCE RELATING TO AN EXTENSION OF THE TERM OF COPYRIGHT IN SOUND 
RECORDINGS 5 (2005), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ 
gowers_cipilreport.pdf. 
 56 Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 18(2) (Eng.). 
 57 Id. §§ 77–89. 
 58 Id. §§ 3, 5. 
 59 Id. Part II. 
 60 See id. §§ 3, 11. 
 61 See id. §§ 9, 11. 
 62 See id. § 185. 
 63 Id. §§ 13, 14. 
 64 Id. § 12.  The Copyright Designs and Patent Act was amended in 1995, extending 
the duration of copyright in literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. Duration of 
Copyright and Rights in Related Performances, 1995, S.I. 1995/3297 (U.K.). 
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European Union, and to a lesser extent by the international 
copyright treaties to which the U.K. is a signatory. 
1. E.U. Copyright Term Extension 
Until 1993, copyright was protected under national law in the 
European Union. Most countries protected a work for a minimum 
of the life of the author plus fifty years,65 but not all European 
countries were Berne signatories.66  The 1993 Directive extended 
and harmonized the term of protection for all copyrighted works 
across Europe to the life of the author plus seventy years,67 and for 
related rights to fifty years.68 
The minimum term of protection for copyright, of life plus fifty 
years, originally laid down in the Berne Convention,69 was 
intended to provide protection for the author and the first two 
generations of his descendants.70  The increase in the term of 
protection in the 1993 Directive to life plus seventy years was 
justified on the basis that life expectancy in Europe, and elsewhere, 
had increased, making it necessary to increase the term of 
protection so as to ensure that the intention in the Berne 
Convention was still honored.71  As has been pointed out by 
William Patry,72 the logic of the extension argument is faulty.  If 
life expectancy increases, then the author also lives longer, and can 
presumably continue to make provision during his longer life for 
his heirs.73  Patry demonstrated that the increased protection is 
likely to benefit even fifth generation descendants.74  The 
“[e]xtension of protection to such remote heirs is impossible to 
 
 65 See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1). 
 66 For example, several Eastern European countries (including Latvia, Lithuania, and 
the Czech Republic) did not join until the 1990s. See World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Contracting Parties: Berne Convention, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). 
 67 Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 6 (EC). 
 68 Id. art. 3. 
 69 See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1). 
 70 See Patry, supra note 48, at 931 n.100. 
 71 Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 5 (EC). 
 72 See Patry, supra note 48, at 932. 
 73 Id. at 931. 
 74 Id. 
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justify in terms of encouraging the author to create, or any 
reasonable societal interest in the author’s immediate heirs.”75 
European law requires the protection of the works of foreign 
authors in the same manner as European works, except that if the 
term of protection in the foreign author’s country is longer than the 
European term, then the European term of protection applies, 
whereas if the term of protection in the foreign country is shorter 
than the European term, then that shorter term applies to protection 
in Europe also.76  It was partly this difference in treatment which 
caused U.S. lawmakers to increase the duration of copyright 
protection in the U.S.77 
2. Related Rights 
The term of protection for related rights was not similarly 
extended by the 1993 Directive and it remained at fifty years.78  
This difference reflected the continuing distinction in the European 
tradition between creators and performers, and the relatively 
greater importance accorded the former as creators of new 
material, rather than as the economic exploiters of pre-existing 
material. 
F. U.S. Copyright Laws and Protection of Performers’ Rights and 
Sound Recordings 
1. The U.S. Constitution 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution wanted to provide a 
balance between creators and innovators and the public.79  The 
U.S. Constitution required Congress to make laws “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.”80  The language makes explicit that the 
 
 75 Id. at 932. 
 76 See CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, supra note 55, at 4. 
 77 See Patry supra note 48, at 924. 
 78 Council Directive 93/98, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 5 (EC). 
 79 See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1072 
(2001). 
 80 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
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Framers recognized that the interests of the public and the interests 
of creators had to be balanced, and, arguably, their formula “to 
promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts” put the 
interests of the public first.81  James Madison, who introduced the 
copyright and patent clause into the Constitution, argued in The 
Federalist that it would increase access to information and operate 
as an incentive system for creators.82  For more than 120 years 
U.S. copyright law adhered to a regime of fairly limited 
protection,83 the public domain was strong,84 and copyright 
protection correspondingly weaker.85 
The structure of copyright protection in the U.S. remains 
somewhat different from the U.K. or Europe, being less specific in 
terms of rights protected and providing for a more general fair use 
exemption, “that can adapt to new technical environments” rather 
than the more specific fair dealing, found under U.K. law.86  Under 
U.S. law sound recordings and performance rights are not treated 
as a lesser type of related right and afforded a type of sui generis 
protection (as they are in Europe) but are protected for the same 
length of time and in the same manner as true copyrights.87 
2. Early U.S. Copyright Law 
Unlike either European law, or U.K. law, from the first 
Copyright Act of 179088 (which borrowed heavily from the Statute 
of Anne) to 1976,89 U.S. law stuck to the utilitarian bargain, 
required registration to protect copyright, and provided a fixed 
term of protection (extendable through additional filing 
 
 81 Id. 
 82 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 83 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 25.  In 1831 the copyright term remained a 
twenty-eight year term, renewable for fourteen years. Under the 1909 act, the term was 
extended to a twenty-eight year term, renewable for twenty-eight more years. Id. 
 84 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (relying on 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), to deny copyright protection to a list of names, 
towns and telephone numbers); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 85 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 25. 
 86 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 62. 
 87 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 102, 103, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 88 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (Copyright Act of 1790). 
 89 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
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requirements) independent of the author’s lifespan.90  The 
registration requirement and its formalities had the disadvantage of 
disproportionately benefiting established publishers, and other 
distributors of copyrighted work with access to lawyers, rather than 
individual authors and creators, who lost countless copyrights by 
failure to comply with the procedural filing requirements and 
deadlines,91 but precisely because copyright did not arise 
automatically and was for a fixed term of years, a strong public 
domain was assured. 
3. U.S. Copyright Law Post 1988 
In 1989, the U.S. changed its longstanding copyright tradition 
by acceding to the Berne Convention,92 which required it to change 
its law to protect copyrighted work from creation, without the need 
for formalities.93  In all Berne Convention signatory countries, 
copyright must arise automatically on the creation of work, and 
last for at least the author’s life and fifty years after his death.94  In 
1998, partly to harmonize with E.U. law, U.S. law was further 
amended to increase the term of copyright protections from life 
plus fifty years, to life plus seventy years, or ninety-five years for 
works made for hire.95 
Since U.S. law treated performers’ rights and rights in sound 
recordings in the same manner as copyrights, the duration of these 
rights was also extended, and although it harmonized the term of 
copyright protection in the E.U. and U.S., the new law created a 
significant difference between the duration of protection for related 
rights in the two jurisdictions. 
 
 90 See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 21, at 79. 
 91 See Patry, supra note 48, at 922 & n.72. 
 92 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(1988). 
 93 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1988). 
 94 See Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1). 
 95 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a), 302(b) 
(1998). 
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4. Sound Recordings 
The position of sound recordings in the U.S. is actually even 
more complicated since U.S. law did not protect sound recordings 
as copyrighted works before 1972,96 and the law was modified in 
1976,97 and again in 1998,98 to harmonize it with international 
standards.  This means that the term of protection in respect of 
sound recordings depends on the date of a particular recording’s 
creation.  It has also not yet been clarified by court decision as to 
whether the “effective beneficiaries of the copyright extensions 
effected by the Sony Bono Act are authors rather than transferees 
of copyright.”99 
Various international treaties currently set minimum terms of 
protection for sound recordings.  The fifty year term is “established 
as the most widely prevailing.”100  This is the minimum term 
required by the TRIPs Agreement101 (seventy-five contracting 
parties including the U.K. and U.S.) and the WIPO Performance 
and Phonograph Treaty102 (fifty-eight parties including the U.S., 
but not the U.K.).  The earlier Rome Convention103 (to which the 
U.S. is not a party), requires the duration of copyright in sound 
recordings to be not less than twenty years from the date the sound 
recording was made. The Universal Copyright Convention sets the 
duration of copyright for sound recordings at twenty-five years.104 
No international treaty requires a minimum protection for 
sound recordings approaching the current U.S. protection of life 
plus seventy years or ninety-five years.  The extended duration of 
the U.S. term, coupled with the globalization of the music and 
 
 96 See Press Release, U.S. Copyright Office, Registration for Foreign Recordings (Mar. 
1972), available at http:/www.copyright.gov/history/mls/ML-83.pdf. 
 97 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1976). 
 98 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. 
 99 See CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, supra note 55, at 8 (referring to the 
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 34, art. 12. 
 102 See WIPO Treaty, supra note 34, art. 17. 
 103 See Rome Convention, supra note 33, art. 14. 
 104 See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 34, art. 4, § 2(a). 
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other copyright-rich industries, and fear of digital technology,105 
has led to intense lobbying, especially by the music industry in 
Europe to extend the term of protection for related rights to 
achieve parity with the U.S.106 
II. THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM AND THE DIGITAL THREAT 
A. Gowers’ Remit 
The effects of globalization and changes in technology have 
increasingly preoccupied not only the music industry and its users, 
but also governments.  In 2005, the U.K. government 
commissioned Andrew Gowers to conduct a review to consider 
whether, in the light of these two phenomena—globalization and 
technological innovations—the U.K. intellectual property system 
remained fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.107  Gowers 
sought input from as many stakeholders in the IP system as 
possible.  In the case of copyright law, hearing from, among 
others, musicians, film producers, and other copyright owners, 
libraries, technology providers, the BBC, consumer groups, 
schools, and members of the general public.108  His review of the 
whole IP system was published on the eve of the December 2006 
budget by the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown.109 
 
 105 See, e.g., MUSIC BUSINESS GROUP, RESPONSE TO UK-IPO CONSULTATIONS ON 
COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS 13, available at http://www.bpi.co.uk/pdf/MBG_Formatshifting 
_Response.pdf (describing studies that suggest ninety percent of music on iPods was 
copied and not purchased). 
 106 Eric Bangeman, U.K. Government Resists Music Industry Pressure, Caps 
Copyrights at 50 Years, ARS TECHNICA, July 24, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2007/07/uk-government-resists-music-industry-pressure-caps-copyrights-at-
50-years.ars. 
 107 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1. 
 108 See id. app. B. 
 109 See Press Release, HMTreasury, Gowers Sets Out Intellectual Property System Fit 
for the Digital Age (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 
prebud_pbr06_pressgowers.htm. 
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B. Responses to the Digital Age 
In the last ten years there have been many responses to the 
changes wrought by digital technology on the landscape of 
copyright and related rights but they all fall into three main 
categories.  Some commentators make the point that many other 
(equally momentous at the time) changes in technology have 
appeared in the past to make the current legal system obsolete, but 
after an initial period of adjustment, it has always survived.110  In 
their view, we are currently in another such period of adjustment 
and no radical changes to the legal system are required.111  Others, 
mainly copyright owners, argue, however, that since digital 
technology has made copying so much easier, the adequate 
protection of their rights requires a strengthening of the whole 
copyright system, including an increase in the duration of 
protection.112  Finally, various academics and technology mavens, 
particularly, assert that while digital technology has indeed 
changed the status quo, the best response is not to strengthen the 
law, but to radically change, or even abolish it, because the current 
legal regime is totally unsuited to the realities of the digital age.113 
1. The “Do-Nothing” Argument 
In Who Controls the Internet, Goldsmith and Wu argue that 
each new change in technology has been treated with horror by 
copyright owners and complaints that it has completely upset the 
balance between owners of copyright and end-users.114  Copyright 
owners have variously complained that the introduction of sheet 
 
 110 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS 
OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 125 (2006). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual 
Property and Free Speech in the “Digital Millennium”, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1321 
(2005) (“[For many copyright owners,] the crucial aspect of the status quo is not legal but 
economic” since “[digital] media make it possible to make a virtually infinite number of 
exact copies at little or no cost.”). 
 113 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF 
CREATIVITY 184–94 (2004) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE] (arguing that the permission 
culture created by today’s copyright system is inefficient). 
 114 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 110, at 125. 
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music, the gramophone, photocopiers,115 VCRs,116 and every 
technology in between, would allow copying of copyrighted 
material and destroy their businesses.  Now they make similar 
charges about file-sharing.117  Complaints come consistently with 
the advent of each new change in technology, or methods of 
distribution, and the argument is always that copyright owners 
need stronger rights to incentivize and protect creativity,118 but as 
people become familiar with each new technology, and incorporate 
it into their business, complaints of copyright infringement settle 
down.119  Given this history, it is safe to assume that the new 
internet and digital technologies will follow a similar path and that 
there is no need to change the law to accommodate these new 
technologies, any more than was necessary for their predecessors. 
2. Strengthen Copyright Protection 
Copyright owners, however, believe that changes in the law are 
urgently required by the ubiquity of digital technology.  Jack 
Valenti (former President of MPAA) was unapologetic in his view 
that the recording industry would be destroyed by the new 
technology and needed to fight back.120  Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch favored remotely 
destroying the computers of those who illegally downloaded 
music.121  The industry has lobbied hard for some time to extend 
the term of copyright in sound recordings, raise awareness of its 
 
 115 See Gervais, supra note 49, at 3 n.6. 
 116 See FREE CULTURE, supra note 113, at 76 (2004). Former president of the MPAA 
Jack Valenti likened VCRs to tapeworms that would eat “away at the very heart and 
essence of the most precious asset the copyright owner has, his copyright.” Id. 
 117 See Farber, supra note 112, at 1338. 
 118 See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Copyright issues in Digital Media, at vii 
(2004). (“In the past, the emergence of new technologies . . . has threatened to tilt the 
scales of the copyright regime by loosening the control that copyright owners enjoy over 
subsequent uses of their works.”). 
 119 See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 110, at 124. 
 120 See Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-To-Peer 
Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before 
the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 108th 
Cong. 17 (2003) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
Motion Picture Association of America). 
 121 Ted Bridis, Senator Favors Really Punishing Music Thieves, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 
2003, at 2C. 
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rights and push for stronger enforcement.122  The copyright 
owners’ views are that the digital age changes the status quo, so 
that the broad fair use rights which were recognized in the pre-
digital era no longer make economic sense.123 Now that users can 
make virtually infinite numbers of perfect copies, stronger legal 
protection is required to protect and support the economic rights of 
IP owners,124 and copyright owners have mounted an increasingly 
aggressive campaign in the media,125 the courts and the 
legislatures, against any unauthorized taking of copyrighted 
materials which the new technology makes ever easier.126 
Unfortunately for copyright owners, extended legal protections 
have increased neither compliance with, nor respect for, the law.  
The copyright legal regime is finding itself more and more at odds 
with social practice.  Copyright protections in sound recordings 
have become widely ignored by the general public.127  The Gowers 
Review noted that as a result of the ease with which the law can be 
circumvented, “copyright in the U.K. presently suffers from a 
marked lack of public legitimacy.  It is perceived to be overly 
restrictive, with little guilt or sanction associated with 
infringement.”128 “Downloading music and films from the internet 
is now the most common legal offence committed by young people 
aged between 10 and 25 in the U.K.”129 
“According to a report commissioned by the British 
Phonographic Industry (BPI), file-sharing cost the music industry 
£414 million in lost sales in 2005, on total sales of £1.87 
 
 122 See, e.g., GOWERS supra note 7, at 96; FREE CULTURE, supra note 113, at 218 
(discussing some of the major media companies’ efforts to increase the term of 
copyrights culminating in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 123 See Farber, supra note 112, at 1321. 
 124 See id. 
 125 Carrie-Ann Skinner, Virgin Music Campaigns Against Illegal File-Sharing, PC 
WORLD, June 6, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/146785/virgin_music 
_campaigns_against_illegal_filesharing.html; Ted Bridis, Music Industry to Target CD 
Pirates in 12 Cities, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 2006. 
 126 See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 7, at 103–06 (describing government policy and 
litigation alternatives on enforcing IP rights). 
128  Ted Bridis, Most Music Downloaders Say They Don’t Care About the Law, CHI. SUN 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at 43. 
 128 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 39. 
 129 Id. at 27. 
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billion.”130  The position is similar all over the world.  In the U.S. 
the recording industry has responded by suing thousands of its own 
customers for downloading copyrighted material without 
permission from the internet.131  As the Gowers Review noted, the 
lawsuits have not halted the illegal downloading of copyrighted 
material.132 
3. Complete Overhaul of Copyright Argument 
Due to the immense shift in technology and its effects, 
commentators outside the music business go further than arguing 
in favor of a return to the weaker copyright and a strong public 
domain which prevailed in the U.S. until 1976,133 and argue that 
the copyright model itself is totally unsuited to the digital age.134  
According to Daniel Farber, “[A] new technology always presents 
the question of whether an existing legal regime should apply.”135  
Lawrence Lessig, among others, believes that the balance in 
copyright law embodied in the Constitution, has become so skewed 
by the powerful economic and corporate forces in favor of 
protecting the monopoly rights of media corporations for near 
perpetual terms, that a radical overhaul of copyright law is now 
needed.136 
The debate has become particularly intense in the last few 
years as each side, particularly in the U.S., strives to “portray 
themselves as defending the status quo ante—the [IP] regime as it 
existed before it was disturbed.”137  Farber calls those who view IP 
 
 130 Id. 
 131 Editorial, Stopping Music Piracy…, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 2008, at C28. 
 132 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 101, 102 chart 5.5. 
 133 See, e.g., VAIDYHANATHAN, supra note 21, 15–16 (arguing for “thin copyright 
protection” that is just long enough to encourage creativity, but not enough to chill a rich 
public domain). 
 134 John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and 
Copyrights in the Digital Age. (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is 
Wrong), WIRED, Mar. 1994, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/ 
economy.ideas.html (“Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or 
expanded to contain digitized expression . . . [w]e will need to develop an entirely new 
set of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.”). 
 135 See Farber, supra note 112, at 1322. 
 136 See id. at 1326–27. 
 137 Id. at 1320. 
VOL19_BOOK3_MONSEAU 4/21/2009  10:10:40 PM 
2009] E.U. COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION 651 
rights as “generating a supply of investment funds for innovation” 
the neo-Hamiltonians because like Alexander Hamilton, they argue 
for strong support from government for industry.138  These neo-
Hamiltonians support strong IP rights and economic dominance by 
the music and media industries.139 He calls the other side neo-
Jeffersonians, because like Thomas Jefferson before them, they 
champion the smaller players and look to “a decentralized future—
in which the Internet and other digital technologies will place 
public discourse and economic innovation in the people’s 
hands.”140 Whatever the different concepts are called, and whoever 
claims to be representing the status quo, there is a great deal of 
agreement outside government and the copyright industries, that 
the duration of copyright protection has become too long and is 
detrimental to the creation and the dissemination of information in 
the digital era.141 
III. THE GOWERS REVIEW 
The Gowers Review was refreshing and unusually independent 
of the influence of the special interests which tend to dominate this 
debate.  It avoided the doom-laden warnings and rhetoric which 
both the music industry and academics bring to the debate over 
how the copyright system needs to be adapted to the digital era.142  
The Review described the ideal IP system as creating “incentives 
for innovation, without unduly limiting access for consumers and 
follow-on innovators,”143 explicitly returning to the forefront of the 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 See id. 
 140 Id. at 1319. 
 141 See, e.g., Patry, supra note 48, at 908 (“United States copyright law has failed of its 
essential purpose—to benefit authors—and is being shaped largely by powerful 
distributors and their lobbyists with the dual goals of extending a monopoly . . . while 
simultaneously depriving authors of as much money as possible.”); FREE CULTURE, supra 
note 113, at 231–33 (2004) (describing the collection of lawyers, organizations, 
corporations, professors, and economists who submitted briefs in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186 (2002), arguing for a limited term of copyright). 
 142 See New Ideas About New Ideas, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2006, at 66 (stating the 
rational, evidence based report will anger the entertainment industry which used “siren 
songs” to win over politicians). 
 143 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 1. 
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debate the fundamental importance of balance between creators 
and end-users. 
Unlike commentators on both sides, the Review did not view 
the current legal system as hopelessly broken.  It pronounced a 
“qualified ‘yes’” to the question of whether the U.K. intellectual 
property system was “fit for purpose in an era of globalisation, 
digitisation and increasing economic specialisation.”144  The report 
dealt with all areas of IP law,145 considering evidence from a broad 
array of stakeholders, on the U.K.’s current system of IP protection 
and how well it is functioning,146 before reviewing in turn, the 
instruments of the intellectual property system and whether they 
were “balanced, coherent and flexible,” the operation of the system 
and how rights are awarded, used and enforced, and the 
governance of the system.147  The Review was comprehensive and 
weighed the arguments made by all stakeholders before setting out 
its recommendations.  The recommendations for changes to the 
law that the Review made which are relevant to this paper are, 
largely, not the changes sought by copyright owners.148 
 
A. Findings and Recommendations 
1. Term of Protection for Sound Recordings 
The Review found that the length of protection for copyright 
works “already far exceeds the incentives required to invest in new 
works.”149  In terms of the correct balance for copyrights, the 
Review made two recommendations: first, that the fifty year term 
of protection currently provided in Europe for sound recordings 
should not be extended, and second, that the government should 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. (stating the report took “a holistic view of the [IP] system”). 
 146 Id. at 5. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Bill Thompson, Intellectual Property Battle Rages On, BBC NEWS, Dec. 8, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6162139.stm. 
 149 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50. 
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adopt the principle that the term and scope of IP rights should no 
longer be altered retrospectively.150 
The Review started by acknowledging the academic and 
popular debate about the optimal length of copyright and related 
rights protection.  It listed five arguments advanced in the Call for 
Evidence in favor of extending the term of protection for sound 
recordings: parity with other countries (particularly the U.S.), 
fairness between composers and performers, increasing incentives 
to invest in new music, increasing incentives to keep work 
commercially available, and the maintenance of a positive trade 
balance for the successful U.K. music industry, and discussed each 
briefly.151 
In assessing the parity argument, the Review noted that 
comparing U.S. and E.U. law is not a comparison of like with 
like.152  While U.S. law provides a longer term of protection, it 
contains various provisions which limit its breadth.  Rights holders 
in the E.U. earn royalties for almost all public performances of 
their work,153 while in the U.S. only play on digital radio earns 
royalties,154 and the Bars and Grills Exception155 means that 
“around 70 per cent of eating and drinking establishments, and 45 
per cent of shops, do not have to pay royalties to performers.”156  
The Review concluded that rights in Europe (although shorter) 
may even be worth more than rights in the U.S.157  Although 
Gowers did not use this argument, it is also worth pointing out that 
the U.S. term is anomalous—other countries have a variety of 
different durations of, and breadth of, rights, but none protect 
sound recordings and other related rights for as long as the U.S. 
term.158 
Gowers dismissed the fairness argument made on behalf of 
performers on the basis that copyright law, as a whole, is about 
 
 150 See id. at 6. 
 151 See id. at 49. 
 152 See id. at 49–50. 
 153 See id. at 50. 
 154 17 U.S.C § 106(6) (2006). 
 155 See id. § 110(5) (2006). 
 156 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 49. 
 157 Id. at 50. 
 158 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 32, 85–91. 
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fairness, as exemplified by the bargain between rights owners and 
society, giving the former a monopoly to incentivize creation.159  
The length of that monopoly is already longer than needed to 
incentivize creation according to various economists.160  It is also 
unclear that any extension would benefit performers, rather than 
the recording companies to whom they have often assigned their 
rights.161  Moreover, after fifty years, few, other than a small band 
of highly successful artists, would benefit from any increases in 
income.162  For these reasons, any extension of the term of 
protection is unlikely to reach more than a few, already very well-
paid, performers, but is likely to provide a windfall for recording 
companies with active back catalogs. 
Gowers did not address the argument that there is a relatively 
lesser risk in performing already created material (the job of the 
performers), rather than creating new material (the job of 
composers), which is the reason that related rights were initially 
created in Europe, and internationally, if not in the U.S., as a 
lesser, economic right more akin to industrial property rather than 
copyright.163 
The argument that an extension will increase investment in 
new music was dismissed by Gowers for a variety of reasons.  
Economic evidence has shown that the “extension for new works 
creates at most 1 per cent value for a twenty year prospective 
extension . . . [and] has negligible effect on investment 
decisions.”164  According to Gowers, plenty of artists are vying to 
create new music, likely without considering whether the song will 
fall out of copyright in fifty, or ninety-five years time.165 
Unfortunately the Review did not specifically address the 
record companies’ arguments that, even if calculations about the 
length of legal protection do not affect the decisions of individual 
artists, corporate investment decisions are based on incentives like 
 
 159 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See id. at 50–51; IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 133. 
 162 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 51. 
 163 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 132–34. 
 164 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52. 
 165 See id. 
VOL19_BOOK3_MONSEAU 4/21/2009  10:10:40 PM 
2009] E.U. COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION 655 
the length of term of protection of sound recordings.166  This 
industry argument is not a strong one because any investment 
decision ought to be based on current law and economic 
conditions, not on the possibility of change. 
Gowers did note that, “[e]vidence suggests that most sound 
recordings sell in the ten years after release, and only a very small 
percentage continue to generate income . . . for the entire duration 
of copyright.”167  Thus any extension of the duration of related 
rights would lock up that music without providing significant 
income for reinvestment to the producers. 
There is a similar issue with another music industry argument 
that a longer duration for related rights would ensure that more 
music would be available to the consumer.168  The Review found 
evidence that those “without legal rights have made more historic 
U.S. recordings available than have rights holders.”169 
Additionally, there would be an impact of extension on 
musicians themselves: “[i]f works [were] protected for a longer 
period of time, follow-on creators . . . would have to negotiate 
licenses to use the work during that extended period” and could be 
blocked by the estates and heirs of performers as well as facing the 
problem of tracing rights holders.170  The Review found that such 
limiting of the public domain by longer terms of protection would 
be more likely to restrict rather than stimulate creativity.171 
2. Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright Protection 
In terms of the flexibility of copyright protection in the U.K., 
the Review made four recommendations to amend U.K. law to 
introduce or clarify certain limited exceptions to copyright.  The 
recommendations were to 
[i]ntroduce a limited private copying exception . . . 
for the format shifting of works . . . [; to] allow 
 
 166 See id. at 49, 52. 
 167 Id. at 52. 
 168 See id. at 49. 
 169 Id. at 54. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. 
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private copying for research to cover all forms of 
content . . . [; to] propose that [E.U. Directive] 
2001/29/EC172 be amended to allow for an 
exception for creative, transformative or derivative 
works, within the parameters of the Berne Three 
Step Test . . . [; and to] create an exception to 
copyright for the purpose of caricature, parody or 
pastiche.173 
All of these exceptions would strengthen the public domain 
and limit the rights of copyright owners.174 
The lack of a private copying exception under U.K. law makes 
it illegal for someone to copy a CD they own to a computer, 
something most of the British public do anyway.  Gowers was 
concerned that this “entirely legitimate activity” should be seen as 
such by the law.175  The Review recommended that the exception 
should be very limited, only allowing one copy to be made for 
private use of music already owned in a different format, but 
should not be accompanied by the “blunt instrument” of a levy, as 
it is in some European legal systems, especially as “[t]he European 
Commission is reviewing the entire body of copyright law, and is 
specifically investigating whether levies work.”176 
The other two recommendations made by Gowers for the 
flexibility of U.K. copyright law—to create an exception for 
transformative use, or derivative works, and to create an exception 
for caricature, parody or pastiche—would also bring U.K. law 
more in line with U.S. law.  As Gowers noted, the first 
recommendation to create a copyright exception for transformative 
use is not even possible under current U.K. law because it is not 
one of the exceptions permitted by the E.U. Information Society 
Directive.177  Gowers recommended that the U.K. government seek 
to amend that Directive to permit such an exception on the grounds 
that “[t]ransforming works can create huge value and spur on 
 
 172 Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC). 
 173 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 6. 
 174 See id. at 61. 
 175 Id. at 63. 
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 177 Id. at 68; see also Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC). 
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innovation.”178  Beethoven and Mozart were both mentioned as 
composers who recycled themes and segments of prior works.179  
Gowers also used comments from The Beastie Boys, and a 
discussion of hip hop music’s homogenization as licensing rights 
get more expensive, to argue in favor of this exception.180 
The Information Society Directive does, however, specifically 
allow for caricature, parody and pastiche, so this recommendation 
could be enshrined in U.K. law without the need for a change to 
European legislation.181  The Review used comments from the 
BBC, regarding how much easier it would make clearing 
programming, to explain its recommendation of this exception.182 
Unlike term extension for sound recordings, where Gowers’ 
recommendation was not to harmonize U.K. law with U.S. law, 
these recommended limitations, if adopted, would have the effect 
of making the copyright exceptions under U.K. law more similar to 
U.S. exceptions.  Gowers argued that exceptions “can create 
economic value without damaging the interests of copyright 
owners” by allowing others to use and build on copyright works.183  
The Review mentioned the Creative Commons movement to show 
“that not all creators are opposed to their work being used to create 
economic value for someone else.”184 
While enabling libraries to copy and format shift for archival 
purposes has not excited much comment, the music industry has 
been unhappy to varying degrees with all the other exceptions 
recommended by Gowers, and particularly with the private 
copying exception.  The music industry’s arguments are reviewed 
later in this paper.185 
 
 178 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 67. 
 179 See id.; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, 
Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 604–05 (2006). 
 180 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 67 (quoting the Beastie Boys saying “we can’t just go 
crazy and sample everything and anything . . .” as much as they would like). 
 181 Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5 § 3(k), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 (EC). 
 182 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 68. 
 183 Id. at 62. 
 184 Id. 
 185 See infra notes 206–14, 263–66 and accompanying text. 
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3. Penalties for Copyright Infringement 
In terms of law enforcement, the Gowers Review did make 
some concessions to copyright owners, recognizing the difficulties 
they have in enforcing their rights in a digital medium.  Its 
recommendations were that penalties for online and physical 
copyright infringement should be matched to make the law more 
coherent,186 and that rights holders in the U.K. should continue to 
“[o]bserve the industry agreement of protocols for sharing data 
between ISPs and rights holders to remove and disbar users 
engaged in ‘piracy.’”187  If this has not proved successful by the 
end of 2007, the recommendation is that the U.K. government 
should consider whether to legislate to require ISPs to assist 
copyright holders in protecting their rights.188 
The issue here is illegal file-sharing, which Gowers recognized 
as jeopardizing “the value of rights held by content industries.”189  
However, the Review also noted that the lawsuits used by the 
entertainment industry to pursue infringers have not led to a 
significant reduction in the activity.190  The Review discussed the 
concepts of “contributory infringement and inducement”191 under 
U.S. law, but declined to suggest legislative changes for the U.K., 
on the grounds “that secondary liability on technology purveyors 
would stifle the availability of public domain works and may chill 
technological innovation.”192 
The Review preferred the idea of encouraging rights owners 
and ISPs to collaborate on identifying and disbarring users from 
engaging in illegal downloading, although it admitted that making 
ISPs liable for secondary infringement might not be compatible 
with E.U. laws,193 presumably because of privacy issues.  Indeed, 
the European Court of Justice recently held that nothing in E.U. 
law required that member states impose a legal obligation on ISPs 
 
 186 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 98. 
 187 Id. at 103. 
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to disclose personal data relating to customers suspected of illegal 
file-sharing to help in a civil action for copyright infringement.194 
Predictably, many in the music industry have not greeted any 
of the Gowers recommendations warmly.195  The music industry 
does not feel that it has had much support from the ISPs in policing 
the web for illegal file-sharing in the past.196  Even if recording 
companies are able to obtain records from ISPs, and ISPs were to 
shut down the accounts of egregious file-sharers, those individuals 
can usually get another internet account relatively quickly and 
easily.  The industry is wary of collaboration with technology 
companies whose new technologies are often seen as the cause of 
the problems of the music business. 
B. Opposing Views in the U.K. and Another Government Proposal 
Although the Gowers Review recommendations on the 
duration of the term of related rights, and specific exceptions to 
copyright were quickly adopted as U.K. government policy,197 the 
House of Commons Culture Media and Sports Committee Report, 
published shortly after Gowers, disagreed with the Gowers’ 
recommendation on the duration of the term of protection for 
sound recordings.198  This government report recommended 
extending the term of protection for related rights to the life of the 
author plus seventy years accorded to copyrights.199  It adopted 
many of the music industries’ arguments, particularly those on 
parity between performers and consumers, stating: 
 
 194 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música De Espaňa v. Telefónica de Espaňa SAU, 
2008 E.C.R. I-00271. 
 195 The day after the Gowers Review was published, a large number of well-known 
figures in the music world took out a full page advertisement in a major national paper 
denouncing the Review’s finding.  See Musicians Sign Copyright Advert, BBC NEWS, 
Dec. 7, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/6216152.stm. 
 196 Paul McGuinness, Manager for U2, Address at MIDEM, Cannes (Jan. 28, 2008), 
available at http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/ 
e3i062b16e707aa99916c212e660cbffd3e. 
 197 See PRE-BUDGET REPORT, supra note 5, at 60. 
 198 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, NEW MEDIA AND THE 
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, FIFTH REPORT, 2006–7, H.C. 509-II, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmcumeds/509/50902.htm 
[hereinafter FIFTH REPORT]. 
 199 Id. ¶ 236. 
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We strongly believe that copyright represents a 
moral right of a creator to choose to retain 
ownership and control of their own intellectual 
property. We have not heard a convincing reason 
why a composer and his or her heirs should benefit 
from a term of copyright which extends for lifetime 
and beyond, but a performer should not.200 
Although it commended the Gowers Review as “thorough,” it 
suggested that the Gowers team had ignored all but economic 
arguments in its deliberations on extending protection for sound 
recordings and other related rights.201  In the Committee’s view, 
the strength and importance of the entertainment industry in the 
U.K. made it particularly strange “that the protection of intellectual 
property rights should be weaker” in the U.K. than in countries 
with less successful industries.202  The Committee did not appear 
to consider that the relatively weaker protection might be 
contributing to the creativity and strength of the industry. 
While faulting Gowers for presenting only economic 
arguments relating to term extension, the Committee failed itself to 
present or discuss any major arguments, contenting itself with 
vague references to the vibrancy, importance and strength of the 
U.K. music industry and the morality and fairness arguments to 
support its conclusion that a term extension was necessary.203 
In a statement before Parliament by the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport, James Purnell, the Government 
congratulated the Select Committee on the Report “highlighting 
the strength and vibrancy of the U.K.’s creative industries,” but 
refused to adopt its recommendations since they were in 
disagreement with Gowers, which it stressed was an independent 
report.204  The Secretary also mentioned the independent report 
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CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT INTO THE NEW MEDIA AND THE 
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES, 2007, Cm. 7186, at 1, 11, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7186/7186.asp. 
VOL19_BOOK3_MONSEAU 4/21/2009  10:10:40 PM 
2009] E.U. COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION 661 
commissioned by the European Commission as part of its review 
of E.U. copyright law,205 which came to essentially the same 
conclusion as Gowers on sound recordings, stating: 
Taking account of the findings of these reports, 
which carefully considered the impact on the 
economy as a whole, and without further 
substantive evidence to the contrary, it does not 
seem appropriate for the Government to press the 
Commission for action at this stage.206 
The Select Committee report did agree with Gowers on the 
need to introduce a private copying exemption into U.K. law, and 
on the importance of ISPs and content owners being encouraged to 
work together toward finding commercial solutions for the piracy 
problem.207 These proposals were accepted by the Government, 
which confirmed its commitment to taking forward the Gowers 
Review.208 
Despite the Gowers Review recommendations being British 
Government official policy, a strong movement in the U.K. music 
industry continued lobbying for an extension of the term of 
protection of sound recordings.209  David Cameron, Conservative 
Leader of the Opposition, also made known that he would support 
the extension if in office, giving as his reason for doing so the 
familiar vibrancy of the British musical scene rationale.210 
Also, a private member’s bill was introduced into the U.K. 
parliament by M.P. Peter Wishart, a former member of a Scottish 
folk-rock group, Runrig, with the aim of extending beyond fifty 
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years the copyright term of sound recordings.211  The bill was to 
receive its second reading before parliament on March 7, 2008, but 
it never did.212  However, since it was not supported by the 
government, and such an extension would have to be made at the 
European level, it seems unlikely that it would have—currently, at 
least—had much effect. 
C. Post-Gowers Action 
In January 2008, the U.K. government published a consultation 
document, Taking Forward the Gowers Review on Intellectual 
Property, to consult on how the reforms to the law recommended 
by Gowers should be made.213  Responses were requested by April 
2008, with legislation promised soon after.214  The consultation 
document was ninety pages long and invited responses to sixty-six 
questions on all aspects of the proposed changes.215  The detail and 
specificity of the questions suggested that the U.K. Intellectual 
Property Office (“IPO”) was truly interested in fashioning a 
copyright law that “is valued by and protects rights holders and is 
both understood and respected by users.”216  The questions were 
fairly open and input was sought from all affected parties. 
The Music Business Group, describing itself as “the collective 
view of the U.K.’s music industry,” was quick to submit to the IPO 
a persuasive paper on its opposition to almost all of the exceptions 
proposed for U.K. copyright law.217  It stated that the music 
industry enabled a “value chain” which directly contributes £6 
billion to the U.K. economy,218 and copyright “is the core 
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mechanism underlying this vast value chain.”219  At present, 
according to the industry, because music is transferable into 
different formats, much of the value of music is enjoyed by 
consumers and technology companies, but creators and right 
holders are “effectively excluded from any value.”220 
The industry paper contended that allowing an exception to 
copyright for format shifting would “enshrine this market failure in 
national legislation.”221  Their proposed solution to the problem of 
the music business being cut out of the value chain was to require a 
license fee to compensate the recording companies for the grant of 
a limited private copying exemption.222  Subject to payment of a 
commercially negotiated license fee, format shifting should only 
be permissible, according to the Music Business Group, if the 
initial copy is legitimately owned and retained the copy is made by 
the owner, for private use, with no onward distribution, 
communication or exploitation.223  Under these conditions the 
industry grudgingly conceded that “a fraction of the value gained 
by others, and the injustice suffered by creators and rights holders, 
is reversed.”224  Some European countries already impose a levy 
on private copying, something rejected by Gowers as “a blunt 
instrument,” and which is also being reconsidered at the European 
level.225 
The Music Business Group’s proposal conveniently ignores the 
fact that it was technology companies like Apple, and not the 
music recording companies themselves, that created and developed 
the hardware and software which made the new “value chain” for 
music possible.226  Without having been involved during the risky 
creation stage, the music industry is now asking for a cut of the 
profits.  The music industry argues that if others derive value from 
manipulating the industry’s product, then the industry deserves 
some of that value, although they did nothing to assist its creation. 
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While the problem of the loss of value to the music industry 
from the illegal copying and distribution of music should be 
addressed, Gowers decided, after consultations with all the 
stakeholders, and not just the music industry, that some exceptions 
to the monopoly rights of copyright owners were needed, 
particularly a private copying exception, because of the reality that 
consumers believed that they could legitimately copy what they 
already owned, and because the music industry had already derived 
value from that sale.227  Gowers was concerned with protecting the 
legitimacy of the law by promoting fairness and equity.  The music 
industry is clearly willing to continue the fight to protect and 
extend their rights.  Recent action by the European Commission 
has shifted the debate to the European level.228 
IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION POSITION ON COPYRIGHT TERM 
EXTENSION 
A. IViR Report 
In November 2006, one month before the Gowers Review 
came out, the Institute for Information Law at the University of 
Amsterdam published its final, and much lengthier report entitled 
The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge 
Economy.229  This report had been commissioned by the European 
Commission’s internal market directorate-general in 2005 as part 
of an overall review of the fifteen years of harmonization of 
copyright and related rights in Europe.230  The 300 page report 
contained seven chapters, reviewing the consolidation of the 
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“acquis communautaire,” including one assessing the arguments 
for and against extending the term of protection for related 
rights.231 
It started by noting that certain stakeholders—the report 
identified phonogram producers—had, for some time, been calling 
for such rights to be extended to align the rights of performers with 
those of authors “in line with the highest international 
standards.”232  The report noted that, by contrast, several groups, 
mainly in the field of technology, had asked the Commission not to 
proceed with any term extension as the term of protection was 
already too long.233  Interestingly, film producers and broadcasting 
organizations had also apparently made no claim for a term 
extension.234  The European Commission Staff Working Paper on 
the European copyright framework in 2004 had summarized the 
policy consensus quite effectively by stating, “an extended term of 
protection would only tend to diminish the choice of music on the 
market by enforcing the flow of revenues from few best-selling 
recordings, while at the same time not providing any real new 
incentives for creation of new recordings or motivating new 
investment.”235 
In analyzing the arguments for and against any term extension 
for sound recordings, the IViR had access to contributions 
submitted by stakeholders to the earlier European Commission 
working paper.236  It also held its own consultations with experts in 
the field, and conducted an extensive evaluation of the legal and 
economic literature.237  The Report produced for the Commission 
was long, detailed and thorough. 
Chapter three of the IViR report described in detail the terms of 
protection currently enjoyed by various related rights at the 
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international, European and national levels and evaluated all the 
arguments its authors could find in favor of term extension, 
dividing them into arguments “concerning the nature and 
objectives of related rights . . . economic arguments, and . . . 
arguments concerning the competition with non-E.U. market 
players.”238  The Report split related rights into two categories, 
(analyzing the rights of performers against phonogram producers, 
film producers, and broadcasting organizations) stating that it 
considered there to be different considerations and objectives for 
performers as opposed to the other related rights holders.239  It also 
contrasted the position of film producers (who as copyright owners 
in Europe already enjoy significantly longer terms of protection), 
with phonogram producers and broadcasting organizations, which 
are currently protected under the fifty years term like 
performers.240 
1. The Nature and Objectives of Related Rights 
Reviewing the legal history of the international recognition of 
related rights, the Report noted that protection at the international 
level for recordings was first achieved in 1961, with the adoption 
of the Rome Convention.241  Phonogram producers and 
broadcasting organizations gained protection under this 
Convention on the grounds that they spent time, money and effort 
on the production of phonograms and broadcasts.242  These rights 
clearly had more in common with other types of industrial property 
like design rights and the sui generis database right.243 
As an industrial right, there was a good argument for 
shortening rather than lengthening this protection to bring it into 
line with the protection provided under E.U. law for other types of 
industrial property such as databases and registered designs.244  
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Gowers also suggested that the duration of the right for sound 
recordings was already too long,245 but did not put the nature and 
objective of these rights in their true place in European IP law as 
economic rights, rather than personality-based rights like 
copyright. 
The IViR also considered the question of whether performers 
merited protection on separate social grounds, that absent 
protection they would be denied recompense for their creative 
achievements, and others would benefit from the profits from their 
fixed performances.246  It noted that, in Europe performers enjoyed 
moral rights under most national legislation to protect their artistic 
integrity,247 but that they had never been recognized as de jure 
authors since there were important conceptual differences between 
creators and performers.248  Most importantly, there is no 
requirement of originality to protect a performance, as there is to 
protect a work of authorship under copyright law.249  This places 
performers in a different category of rights holders because they 
gain protection for their endeavors simply by recording their work, 
without having to achieve the higher bar of originality.  This point 
is one familiar in the civil law tradition, that performance is a 
lesser economic right because it protects something less risky than 
the creative activity involved in writing or composing.250 
The Report conceded that performers may perhaps require 
greater rights than the producers of sound recordings.251  However, 
if the main reason for term extension is the laudable goal of 
providing social security to performing artists in their later years, 
then, in the view of the IViR authors, it was likely only to benefit a 
very small percentage of performers still popular after fifty years, 
and generally these were the performers least in need of that 
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extend protection for performers but not producers because the reasons for protecting 
performers are comparable to the reasons for protecting authors). 
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benefit.252  The IViR suggested that perhaps extending moral rights 
protection for performers might be more justifiable and helpful 
than extending their economic rights.253 
The Report pointed out that, in reality, it is not performers’ 
intellectual property rights that need strengthening but their 
contractual rights.254  Studies suggest that only the top performers 
control their own performance rights.255  For most artists, whether 
they will receive any benefit from the increase in term depends on 
their contractual arrangements with the recording company.256  In 
most cases the beneficiary of any increase in the term of 
performers’ rights is likely to be the recording company. 
As for the rights of phonogram producers, film producers and 
broadcasting organizations, the main justification for their rights 
was seen by the authors of the Report as economic; to protect and 
serve as an incentive for investment.257  The IViR found that, given 
the strong economic arguments advanced by rights holders in favor 
of more protection, it was unfortunate that they had provided little 
empirical evidence to substantiate their claims for a longer term.258  
Although economic incentive arguments are usually given as the 
main justification for extending related rights, there continues to be 
little real evidence as to what extent any IP rights, and related 
rights specifically, provide “incentives to promote innovat[ion], 
creat[ion] and invest[ment] . . . .”259 
 
 252 Id. at 133. 
 253 See id. 
 254 See id. at 121. 
 255 See, e.g., Ruth Towse, Copyright and Economic Incentives: An Application to 
Performers’ Rights in the Music Industry, 52 KYKLOS 369, 388 (1999) [hereinafter 
Copyright and Economic Incentives] (“[L]arge sums of royalty income . . . goes mainly 
to the publishers . . . and to a small minority of high earning performers . . . who can 
defend their own interests in the marketplace by virtue of their bargaining power . . . to 
control their own affairs by contractual arrangements.”). 
 256 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 121. 
 257 See id. at 105. 
 258 Id. at 113. 
 259 Id. at 106. 
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2. Economic Arguments 
The Review considered the small amount of empirical evidence 
provided by the music industry concerning the revenues they spend 
on discovering and developing new talent.260  Since recordings 
made before the late 1950’s, and therefore about to lose protection, 
provided only three percent of record company income, and a 
similar percentage of performers’ rights collected by collection 
societies, extending the term of protection of such rights would, in 
the view of the IViR authors, have no more than a limited impact 
on the money available to invest in new music.261  The same 
conclusion was reached by Gowers.262 
In terms of recouping investment in particular sound 
recordings, there was also a variety of evidence provided by the 
music industry from which the Report’s authors adduced that 
between 3,000–20,000 CDs had to be sold to produce a profit for 
the average recording.263  The average Top 40 album in March 
2006 sold 100,000 copies worldwide per week, but the vast 
majority of recordings sold far fewer.264  However, music 
recordings had short life cycles, typically selling mainly in the first 
year or even months after release.265  Thus, reasoned the authors, if 
a recording had not recouped its investment in the first fifty years 
after release, it was extremely questionable whether an extension 
of the term of protection would enable it to do so.266 
The Report considered the “[i]mpacts of extending the term of 
protection . . . on access, cultural diversity, and the effects of 
digitisation” on music.267  Rights holders have argued that 
extending their rights is likely to increase access to music by 
encouraging them to exploit their back catalogs.268  Gowers had 
found this argument unpersuasive on the basis of U.S. research 
 
 260 These estimates range from 2–17% of net revenues. Id. at 115. 
 261 Id. at 114–15. 
 262 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52. 
 263 IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 112. 
 264 See id. at 113. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 116. 
 268 See id. at 117. 
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showing that more historic U.S. recordings were made available by 
those without legal rights than by the rights holders.269  The IViR 
Report noted that the exploitation of back catalogs is only valuable 
for a small share of recordings that continues to generate 
commercial value.270  Most recordings quickly became 
unavailable.  Extending the term of protection for many sound 
recordings would simply ensure that this music remained locked 
away from exposure to the public for longer, especially since rights 
holders had no positive obligation to exploit their rights, and are 
unlikely to do so if they perceived no immediate commercial 
gain.271  Allowing such material into the public domain might 
actually be preferable from a public welfare perspective, as it could 
be exploited by others, whether other commercial organizations or 
non-profit, or educational groups.272 
The Report noted that digitization offered new opportunities to 
remarket and distribute back catalogs in new distribution formats 
but that this technology had not always been embraced by the 
music industry.  Rights holders have now proposed, according to 
the IViR, that a longer term of protection would create an incentive 
for them to digitize their back catalogs and benefit from the so-
called “long tail effect” of the many sound recordings that sell in 
small numbers, in contrast to the small number of high-selling, 
mass-appeal recordings.273  An online store unconstrained by space 
can stock and exploit many more niche recordings and low sellers 
than a brick-and-mortar store, and the “long tail effect” means that 
it can make money from them even with low individual sales 
volumes.274  Of course, the possibilities of digitization have been 
with us for a few years, and various business models have been 
embraced by technology companies to capture value from 
digitization.275 
 
 269 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 54. 
 270 IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 116. 
 271 See id. at 116, 118. 
 272 See id. at 116. 
 273 See id. at 117. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See id. 
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The IViR contended that it was questionable that an extension 
of the term of sound recordings would be likely to induce the 
recording industry to make use of new digital business models 
since they have so far been loath to do so.276  The authors also 
questioned whether related rights protection would be the best 
means for creating incentives to explore this potential.277 
The music industry, of course, sees this differently, contending 
that they have been left out of this new value creation.278  Their 
response to the U.K. IPO consultation described Sony’s 
commercially unsuccessful experience of providing customers 
access to digitized music that could only be played on a Sony 
device.279  It apparently took Sony four years to listen that 
customers wanted portable music.280  Sony (and the rest of the 
music industry) did not appear to learn from this experience the 
lesson that a successful business must adapt its business strategy to 
provide what the customer wants.  Rather, the point made by the 
Music Business Group was that the customer was taking value 
from the business.281  The proposal in the Music Business Group 
report is for a digital business model which would enable the 
industry to generate income by imposing a levy for format shifting 
music that the customer already owns in another format.282  This 
would certainly create value for the industry by enabling 
companies to sell something they have already sold.  The IViR 
report is right to be skeptical of whether the music industry will 
suddenly embrace new business ideas simply because related rights 
receive a longer term of protection. 
 
 276 See id. 
 277 Id. (“It is questionable whether protection of sound recordings beyond 50 years 
would actually induce phonogram producers to better make use of the new business 
potential of digital distribution, and whether related rights protection is the adequate 
measure for creating incentives to exploit this potential in the first place.”). 
 278 See MUSIC BUSINESS GROUP, supra note 105, at 15. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 See id. 
 282 See id. at 17 (consumers would have a private exception, while “businesses, services 
or device manufacturers who gain direct value from their customers’ ability to format 
shift music have a responsibility to creators and right holders”). 
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The IViR Report decided, on balance, that extending the term 
of related rights would hurt, rather than help, the diversity of 
European music, especially given that 81% of the European market 
is dominated by four global labels which already have significant 
control over exploitation and distribution of music within 
Europe.283  This concentration within the industry goes some way 
to explaining the music industries’ lobbying power, as well as 
providing a significant reason why politicians should be cautious 
about changing the law to benefit the industry without clear 
evidence of benefit to the rest of society.  If a group lobbies for a 
change to the law, they should, at the least, be required to show 
that any change to the status quo provides a benefit, to those other 
than themselves and preferably to society as a whole.  The increase 
in term for sound recordings and performers’ rights clearly 
provides a windfall to recording companies but appears unlikely to 
benefit anyone else. 
According to the IViR, the cost increases created by the related 
rights monopolies only serve a useful function if they are an 
“unavoidable consequen[ce] of an incentive system for which there 
is no better alternative.”284  The extension of the term beyond fifty 
years would increase deadweight costs and thus be detrimental to 
the public domain.285  There would likely be higher licensing costs 
to pay for the secondary use of sound recordings in every area 
from podcasts to play in restaurants.  Tracing costs to find the 
rights owners of older recordings would also likely increase, 
especially as there is no central database for such rights in 
Europe.286  Sound recording prices would likely remain higher for 
consumers.287  It is clear that the main beneficiaries in all this 
would be the recording companies.  Performing artists might not 
even benefit greatly from any increased term of protection, since 
although they might receive remuneration from collecting societies 
 
 283 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 118. 
 284 Id. at 119. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See, e.g., Wikibooks—UK Database Law: Existence, http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/ 
UK_Database_Law (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (“Copyright arises automatically in a 
work that meets the criteria outlined below. There is no need to register copyright in a 
database with a central organisation.”). 
 287 IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 120. 
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for the longer period (assuming, of course, their music remained 
popular), they have often contracted away their exclusive rights in 
their performances and sound recordings to recording companies, 
who would thus be the main beneficiaries of any term increase.288 
3. Competition with Non-E.U. Players 
The IViR Report dealt with the argument that the term of 
protection in Europe put European rights holders at a competitive 
disadvantage with rights holders in non-E.U. countries by stating 
that the only country with significantly longer protection for 
related rights—the U.S.—does not apply a “comparison of terms” 
so Europeans receive the same legal protection as Americans in the 
U.S. market.289  The music industry had suggested that the 
European music industry might become less profitable because the 
longer term of protection in the U.S. might cause European 
producers to make recordings specifically to sell in the U.S. rather 
than Europe, to the detriment of European diversity and culture.290  
The music industry also argued that if sound recording rights were 
extended in Europe, then European record companies could 
increase the value of the intangible assets recorded in their balance 
sheets.291 
The IViR debunked these arguments.  The authors considered 
that it was questionable whether the term of protection would 
directly affect the international competitiveness of the recording 
industry on a large scale given the many other factors affecting its 
competitiveness, such as, importantly, the ability to use new 
distribution channels.292  Given that the share of the domestic 
market in the U.S. provided by domestic music was 93% (much 
higher than the domestic share of the music market in most 
European countries) the Report concluded that there was no 
evidence to suggest that there was a large market for European 
music in the U.S., or that music companies were trying to develop 
 
 288 Id. at 133. 
 289 See id. at 128–29 (discussing the level of protection that all phonogram producers 
receive under the U.S. Copyright Act). 
 290 Id. at 122–23. 
 291 See id. at 131. 
 292 Id. at 127. 
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it, in fact, the opposite, since it was clear that most music was sold 
in its own national market.293  There was also no good evidence 
that music companies would benefit in accounting terms from an 
increased duration of sound recording rights, given that most did 
not include the value of their own catalogs as intangible assets in 
their balance sheets at all, and amortized any externally acquired 
music catalogs within twenty years, strongly suggesting that the 
true position of recouping investment in music is that it is done 
within the first few years of release, or not at all.294 
The IViR reiterated what the music industry has been careful to 
avoid mentioning, which is that “from an international perspective, 
American terms are anomalous and cannot serve as a justification, 
from a legal perspective, for extending the terms of related rights 
in the E.U.”295  The Report concluded that there were no good 
legal, economic or comparative arguments for extending the term 
of related rights and, like the Gowers Review, recommended 
against it.296 
B. E.U.  Commission Proposal 
Approximately one year after the IViR and Gowers had 
published their thorough reviews of the question of extension of 
the term of protection for sound recordings, on February 14, 2008, 
the E.U. Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Charlie 
McCreevy, proposed that the term of copyright protection for 
European performers should be extended to ninety-five years in 
Europe.297  In doing so, the Commissioner ignored the evidence of 
the Gowers Review,298 the E.U. commissioned IViR report299 and 
the Commission’s own staff working paper on the European 
copyright framework.300  The Commission proposal has been 
strongly supported by French president Nicholas Sarkozy, a big fan 
 
 293 See id. 
 294 See id. at 131. 
 295 Id. at 132. 
 296 Id. at iii–ix. 
 297 See Performing Artists, supra note 10. 
 298 GOWERS, supra note 7, at 6. 
 299 IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 101. 
 300 See Review of EC Legal Framework, supra note 235. 
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of sixties pop, and friend of Johnny Hallyday, one of France’s 
best-known rock stars.301  Mr. Sarkozy indicated that he would 
make copyright extension a priority of France’s six-month turn at 
the European Union presidency, which started in July 2008.302 
The reason for the proposed change to European law, 
according to Commissioner McCreevy is the disparity between the 
copyright protection afforded the composer, and the protection 
afforded the performer; “[it] is the performer who gives life to the 
composition and while most of us have no idea who wrote our 
favourite song—we can usually name the performer.”303  
According to the press release of the announcement, Mr. 
McCreevy was particularly concerned about royalties for 
anonymous session musicians, rather than those for big-name 
featured artists.304  Mr. McCreevy stated that, because many 
musicians start recording in their twenties, royalty income stops 
when they are in the most vulnerable period of their lives 
(retirement) and since life expectancy in the E.U. (seventy-five for 
men and eighty-one for women) means performers are living 
longer, they need their performers’ rights income to continue into 
retirement.305 
This argument conveniently ignores the issue noted by both 
Gowers and IViR that only a minority of musicians remain 
sufficiently popular to even earn royalties for the current fifty-year 
term, let alone seventy years or ninety-five years,306 and in any 
case, most performers—especially anonymous session 
musicians—have often signed away any rights in their recordings 
or performances to record companies.307  Thus, as a retirement 
program for musicians, extending the duration of performers’ 
rights, would be ineffective for all but the most successful 
performers, who probably do not require it. 
 
 301 See Bremner, supra note 2. 
 302 See id. 
 303 See Performing Artists, supra note 10. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing how most sound recordings make profit 
within first ten years of production). 
 307 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 121. 
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The difference between the rights of performers and composers 
is also discussed in the Gowers Review and the IViR Report.  In 
the IViR Report it is noted that there are significant conceptual 
differences between the two types of actors.  Composers are 
treated as creators by European law, because they assume more 
risk,308 while performers, having no requirement to create original 
materials, have more in common with the owners of other 
industrial property rights.309 
Gowers noted that the whole copyright bargain was about 
fairness, and the fairness most ignored was that of the bargain 
between the public, and creators and performers.310  Gowers also 
pointed out that performers were very unlikely, because of 
contractual arrangements with recording companies, to see much 
benefit from any term increase.311 
Both Gowers and the IViR Report concluded from this that the 
rights accorded to performers are probably already too long rather 
than too short.312  It should be noted that performers also have the 
opportunity to exploit their celebrity status in other ways generally 
unavailable to composers (who, tellingly, as McCreevy pointed 
out, are often unknown to the general public).313 
McCreevy also advanced the music industry argument that the 
shorter term for performers’ rights limited the recording 
companies’ ability to reap the benefits of their original investment 
in the recording,314 a position which is contradicted by almost 
everyone who has considered it outside the music industry,315 but 
which was raised once again by the music industry in their 
 
 308 See Towse, supra note 30, at 748. 
 309 IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 133, 134. 
 310 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 50 (“But the fairness argument applies to society as a 
whole.  Copyright can be viewed as a ‘contract’ between rights owners and society for 
the purpose of incentivising creativity.”). 
 311 See id. at 50–51. 
 312 See id. at 50 (“Economic evidence indicates that the length of protection for 
copyright works already far exceeds the incentives required to invest in new works.”); 
IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 101 (“[T]he existing terms of protection of related rights  
. . . are already very long.”). 
 313 See Performing Artists, supra note 10. 
 314 See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228. 
 315 See, e.g., GOWERS, supra note 7, at 52; IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 113. 
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response to Taking Forward, the U.K. government consultation on 
the Gowers’ recommendations.316  McCreevy also, of course, 
mentioned that changing the law would bring European law in line 
with U.S. law,317 without mentioning the important point that the 
U.S. law in question provided a term of protection which was 
anomalous internationally.318 
Commissioner McCreevy dealt in his announcement with the 
familiar counterargument for consumers—that the proposed 
change to the law would increase prices.  He said that studies 
showed that the price of sound recordings out of copyright “[wa]s 
not lower than [those] in copyright.”319  The “studies” from which 
he derived this evidence were not made public, but the likely 
candidate is the Price Waterhouse Coopers study commissioned for 
the British Music Industry in order to respond to the Gowers 
Review.320  This could hardly be called an independent study.  
While apparently finding no price differential between music out 
of copyright and that still protected, even Price Waterhouse 
Coopers cautioned that there were not many recordings in the 
public domain on which to base its findings.321 
In several more clearly independent studies, researchers have 
found what would be expected, namely that the price of 
copyrighted works drops once copyright protection has expired.322  
 
 316 See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE FOR CREATIVITY & INNOVATION, TAKING 
FORWARD THE GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 60, available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-copyrightexceptions.pdf (“It is, however, important to 
recall the finding from the OECD’s digital music report, that most artists are still 
supported by recording companies.”). 
 317 David Cronin, Proposed EU Copyright Term Extension Faces Vocal Opposition In 
Parliament, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
weblog/2009/01/27/eu-copyright-term-extension-meets-vocal-opposition-in-parliament/. 
 318 See IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 132. 
 319 See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228. 
 320 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Proposal on a Directive for 
Term Extension Frequently Asked Questions (July 16, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/508 [hereinafter 
Commission Proposal on a Directive] (citing PRICE WATERHOUSE, THE IMPACT OF 
COPYRIGHT EXTENSION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS IN THE UK (2006)). 
 321 See CTR. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. & INFO. LAW, supra note 55, at 43. 
 322 See, e.g., Paul Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted 
Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best Sellers 
(2007), at 3, 7, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955954. 
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Gowers and the IViR Report both referred to studies showing that 
prices tended to decrease once copyright protection expired.323 
The French apparently believe that support for an extension is 
rising in Europe and that, during their six month presidency of the 
European Union, they would be able to overcome British and 
German reluctance to extending the term of copyright.324  On July 
16, 2008, shortly after the beginning of the French Presidency, and 
to the delight of older European musicians, the Commision started 
the process of consultation on changing the law by releasing its 
proposal to “align the copyright term for performers with that 
applicable to authors.”325  The proposal envisaged extending the 
term of protection from fifty to ninety-five years, although the 
extension would contain a use it or lose it provision so that rights 
would only be extended for work commercially released.326  
Commissioner McCreevy committed himself to ensuring 
performers maintained “a decent income and that there w[ould] be 
a European-based music industry in the years to come.”327 
C. Reaction to the Commission Proposal in Europe 
Reaction to the Commission proposal from the British 
government, European academics and even some musicians, was 
swift.  In a press release two days after the proposal was 
announced, U.K. government Minister of Intellectual Property, 
Baroness Delyth Morgan said: “Because copyright represents a 
monopoly we need to be very clear that the circumstances justify 
an extension. We will therefore need to consider these proposals 
 
 323 See GOWERS, supra note 7, at 55 fig. 4.4; IVIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 113 (citing 
Stan J. Liebowitz, What are the Consequences of the European Union Extending 
Copyright Length For Sound Recordings? (Feb. 2006) (unpublished study), available at 
http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/liebowitz-study-aug2007.pdf). 
 324 See Bremner, supra note 2. 
 325 See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228. 
 326 See Commission Proposal on a Directive, supra note 320; see also Dave Rowntree, 
EU Strikes the Wrong Note on Copyright, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/07/17/do1707.xml. 
 327 Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228. 
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carefully to understand how they would work and what the benefits 
are likely to be.”328 
A change in the E.U. law harmonizing copyright and related 
right protection across Europe will necessitate a change in U.K. 
law even though current U.K. government policy opposes an 
extension.  The U.K. IPO had been seeking input from all 
stakeholders on the private copying extension recommended by 
Gowers.329  Once the European proposal was made public, the IPO 
extended its deadline for consultation to allow for any comments 
on the E.U. proposal, reiterating that evidence from Gowers and 
other sources suggested that extending the term of protection 
would hurt both consumers and industry.330 
In June 2008, fifty leading European copyright academics 
produced a more detailed critique of the Commission proposal 
described in Commissioner McCreevy’s February press release.331  
They sent their statement to the Commission on July 16, 2008, in 
order, they said, to assist in “rational policy making.”332  
Unfortunately, it arrived too late to have an effect on the 
Commission’s decision making since the Commission announced 
the process of consultation to amend E.U. law that same day.333 
The Bournemouth University statement unequivocally 
recommended against any term extension.  It reviewed all the 
available empirical data on the four main arguments it identified in 
favor of term extension: These were the usual economic and 
comparative arguments favored by the music industry, namely that 
older artists would benefit from it, that it would result in more 
sound recordings being made available to the public, that price 
would be unaffected, and that it would remove harmful trade 
 
 328 Press Release, U.K. IPO, UK-IPO Response to the European Commission’s 
Proposal to Extend the Term of Copyright Protection (July 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/press/press-release/press-release-2008/press-release-
20080718.htm [hereinafter UK-IPO Response]. 
 329 See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 213, at 5. 
 330 See UK-IPO Response, supra note 328. 
 331 Martin Kretschmer et al., Creativity Stifled? A Joined Academic Statement on the 
Proposed Copyright Term Extension for Sound Recordings, June 2008, available at 
http://www.cippm.org.uk/images/Bournemouth%20Statement.pdf. 
 332 Id. at 2. 
 333 See Commission Adopts Forward-Looking Package, supra note 228. 
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disparities between the European and U.S. markets.334  For each of 
these arguments and citing academic studies, the Gowers Review 
and submissions to it, as well as the European Commission’s own 
staff working paper, the academics found the evidence was clearly 
against the music industry.335 
On the claim that Commissioner McCreevy made about term 
extension assisting older artists in their declining years, the 
academics pointed to evidence that “artists’ earnings are primarily 
a matter of contract, not copyright.”336  Extending the term of 
related rights protection would simply provide a windfall for 
record companies, while providing little or no benefit to artists, 
who have often contracted their rights to their recording company 
in return for a lump sum payment.337 
Concerning the supply of new music, the Bournemouth 
academics findings were that, “[a]ny serious empirical work that 
has been done on this issue, points in the direction of common 
sense.” That is, musical compositions were more likely to be 
exploited once they were in the public domain, and a vibrant public 
domain helped, not hindered creativity.338  For example, one study 
they cited found that music in the public domain was more often 
used in films than protected music.339 
On the price issue, the academics noted that it was 
“preposterous” for recording companies to simultaneously claim 
that they needed term extension to boost revenue while arguing 
that it would have no effect on price, and they urged the 
Commission to seek “robust evidence” on this subject.340 
The Bournemouth academics pointed out that the trade 
argument made by the music industries was really two arguments.  
The first was essentially that American artists had the comparative 
advantage of a better regulatory environment due to longer terms 
 
 334 Kretschmer et al., supra note 331, at 3–12. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Id. at 3. 
 337 Id. at 4, 7. 
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 340 Id. at 8–9. 
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of copyright protection.341  The second was the unrelated balance 
of payment issue and the suggestion that, because of the longer 
term, European copyright owners were remitting money to 
America.342  The academics believed that the shorter term in 
Europe actually benefited Europeans in terms of creativity, “[i]n 
terms of comparative advantage, the shorter term gives Europe an 
edge in innovation.”343  Also, since the U.S. provided reciprocity, 
commercial conditions were equal for players on both sides of the 
Atlantic.344 
On the balance of payment issue the academics pointed out that 
given that four large multinationals with opaque accounting 
techniques controlled over 70% of global music,345 it was difficult, 
if not impossible, to determine whether additional revenues would 
flow to or from Europe.  Consequently, they suggested that the 
effects of a term reduction for related rights needed to be as 
thoroughly investigated by the Commission as the effects of a 
proposed extension, before making policy based on this 
argument.346 
Only a few days after the Commission proposal was made 
public a group of some of the same copyright scholars who had 
drafted the Bournemouth Statement, published a letter in The 
Times proclaiming, “Copyright extension is the enemy of 
innovation.”347  In their letter they pointed out that the Commission 
proposal would prevent culturally important sound recordings from 
the 1950s and 60s from entering the public domain for another 
forty-five years, while benefiting no one other than large music 
companies.348  They also stressed that the proposal was counter to 
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 347 Lionel Bently et al., Letter to the Editor, Copyright Extension is the Enemy of 
Innovation, TIMES ONLINE, July 21, 2008, at 17, available at 
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all independent external expertise on this issue, including the IViR 
Report, which was a study conducted for the Commission itself.349 
In addition to academics from across Europe, even some 
musicians made known their opposition to the Commission’s 
proposal.  Writing in the British paper, The Daily Telegraph, Dave 
Rowntree, drummer with Blur, argued that the Commission 
proposal was a mistake that could have disastrous consequences 
for “access to our recorded heritage” and that confusing copyright 
law with contracts and pensions was not a good idea.350  It was 
simply not true that any increased earnings would keep “starving 
artists” from poverty.351  In common with others in this debate, he 
marveled that the Commission had apparently simply ignored all 
the analysis done by Gowers and the other independent reviewers 
and had “[thrown] out the economic evidence.”352 
Unfortunately, once again none of these arguments appear to 
have been heard in Europe.  On February 12, 2009 the Legal 
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament approved the 
Commission proposal to amend the European Copyright Directive 
to increase the term of protection for sound recordings to ninety-
five years.353  In what might be interpreted as a sop to the many 
critics who have argued that any extension will primarily provide a 
windfall financial benefit recording companies and not performers, 
the press release of the proceedings notes that the committee 
introduced two additions to the original directive: a clause 
preventing music recording companies from using previous 
contractual agreements to deduct money from any additional 
royalties due to performers under the extension; and provision for a 
dedicated fund for session musicians to be paid for by recording 
companies out of “revenues gained from the proposed extension of 
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copyright term.”354  The proposed legislation is scheduled to be 
voted on by the European Parliament in March 2009, and must also 
be separately approved by the Council of Europe.355 
V. LIKELY DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON RELATED RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
AND THE GLOBAL DEBATE 
As so many including Rowntree have pointed out, the 
European Commission proposal adopted by the Legal Affairs 
Committee ignores all the available evidence on the topic of term 
extension.356  The Gowers Review and the IViR Report both 
provided detailed analyses of the effect on all stakeholders, not 
simply the music industry, of extending the term of protection for 
sound recordings.  These reports both found that the only goal 
likely to be served by increasing the term of protection for sound 
recordings was an increase in profits for recording companies.  
They both also concluded that the other arguments used to justify 
an extension by the music industry, namely that it would provide 
money in royalties for older artists, that it would not increase 
prices, and that it was necessary to harmonize E.U. law with U.S. 
law, did not stand up to scrutiny.  Both studies found that the 
consequences of a change to the law were more likely to be that 
music became more expensive and less available, thus decreasing 
opportunities for creativity and innovation by the next generation 
of musical talent. 
It is hard to believe that any stakeholders other than the 
recording companies, and, perhaps, a few select, successful older 
musicians will see a benefit from the proposed change to European 
law.  However, in the face of similar discontent in 1998, U.S. law 
was amended, ostensibly to bring it into line with European law.357 
Unfortunately, it is hard to think of an instance in the recent 
history of copyright and related rights protection where the public 
domain has triumphed over the interests of rights holders.  The 
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content industries have far greater lobbying power than those 
defending the public domain, and across the globe legislation has 
steadily increased protection for rights holders at the expense of 
the public domain.358  Along the way there have been a few 
challenges, generally unsuccessful, to extensions of the law,359 but 
under both treaties, and national laws rights have steadily been 
increased and extended.360 
The European Commissioner argues that the proposal to extend 
the term of related rights in Europe is to ensure Europe’s place in 
the “knowledge economy” by encouraging creativity.361  However, 
creativity and innovation in Europe, and elsewhere, is far more 
likely to be encouraged by expanding the public domain so that 
artists can reinterpret and borrow themes without fear of litigation 
by rights holders.  Innovation is less likely to come from increasing 
intellectual property rights, although this will increase the profits 
of current rights holders. 
The globalization and digitization of the world economy have 
changed the economics of creativity, and some industries have 
been better than others at determining how to derive value from 
their product when new technologies allow it to be copied 
perfectly, many times over, and at minimal cost.  So far, in the 
copyright sphere it has not been those who control copyrights and 
related rights, like recording companies, who have created new 
opportunities for exploiting their products in the digital economy.  
Successful services like iTunes, and applications that enable music 
to be played on cell phones or social networking sites, have been 
created by technology companies.362 
 
 358 See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. 
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Competitors, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2001, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
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Robbin, who was hired away from Casady and Greene to develop iTunes for Apple). 
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The music industry is arguing for extension to its already long, 
existing rights because it has not, so far, found a successful 
alternative business model in this new economy and wants to 
derive as much value as possible from its existing, failing, business 
model.  It has been successful in courts and legislatures in the U.S. 
in obtaining greater rights and has now concentrated its attention 
on extending the term of related rights protection in Europe. 
The European Commission and Parliament are in a real 
position to halt the record company’s lobbyists continued, 
unwarranted, diminution of the public domain, and influence the 
global debate about the optimum strength of copyright and related 
rights protection in the new economy.  Unfortunately the current 
E.U. strategy appears to be to carry out the music industry’s 
bidding and increasing the term of protection without regard to the 
evidence.  There are two major independent analyses at European 
lawmakers’ disposal, both of which clearly find that term extension 
is likely to harm rather than help Europe’s position as a center of 
innovation in the global economy. 
The European Union has the power to send a message to the 
music industry lobby that it has more than sufficient legal 
protection in Europe and that policymakers in Europe understand 
that the real innovation in the digital and global economy will 
come, not from outdated models like that of the record companies, 
but from new models which embrace the new possibilities for 
recording and distributing music, and are already being developed 
by the technology sector.  These industries are not served by, and 
have not sought or supported an extension of the term of related 
rights.363  It is hard to decrease legal protections but it is clear from 
all independent analyses on this topic that the music industry 
already has a greater degree of protection than is warranted by the 
evidence.  The E.U. should consider very carefully before 
providing yet greater rights. 
The Gowers Review, the IViR, the comprehensive U.K. IPO 
consultation on the Gowers Review recommendations, and the 
European Commission proposal all considered carefully the 
available evidence on term extension.  The reports included 
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significant analysis, based on review of the research and extensive 
consultations with many stakeholders, and each report clearly 
concluded that content owners and distributors such as recording 
companies currently enjoyed rights that were already far more 
extensive than necessary to encourage creativity.  The music 
industries’ arguments in favor of even greater rights were weak 
and inconsistent, and debunked in each successive independent 
report. 
Every serious consideration of the issues found that the price of 
music would be likely to increase, consumer choice would be 
likely to diminish, and little, if any, extra money would be 
provided to artists whose rights were generally more a matter of 
contract rather than intellectual property law.  In fact, it is agreed 
by almost all commentators outside the music industry that the 
main beneficiaries of any change in the law in Europe would be 
music recording companies. 
Despite the evidence, the E.U. has proposed extending the term 
of protection from fifty to ninety-five years.  Any change to the 
legal system should only be effected if there is significant benefit 
to the public.  Intellectual property laws are intended to provide a 
balance between the interests of the public and rights owners.  
Extending the term of protection for related rights to ninety-five 
years is tantamount to providing for a perpetual copyright term, 
and essentially eliminates all balance in favor of the interests of 
rights holders.  It is to be hoped that the E.U. Commission and 
Parliament will review the evidence once again and listen to 
feedback on its proposal from those outside the music industry 
before approving any changes to E.U. law. 
CONCLUSION 
The E.U. currently has an historic chance to acknowledge that 
copyright and related-right owners have been extremely successful 
lobbyists, and have been granted rights over the last few decades 
far beyond those necessary to foster creativity, skewing the 
balancing act that copyright law is supposed to perform, clearly 
away from the public domain.  These extensive rights are likely to 
eventually become a disservice even to rights holders because such 
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strong rights will tend to slow innovation and restrict creativity, 
something likely to be particularly important in the digital age.  A 
refusal to further expand its IP rights might even cause the music 
industry to change its increasingly outdated business model, and 
find new ways to encourage innovation in music and the arts. 
 
